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The session focused on the classification of international armed conflicts 
(IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and the subtle 
distinctions in those classifications that can substantially affect the rules of 
conflict.  In particular, the session dealt with the aspect of consent, or lack 
thereof, of territorial States to allow another state to use force within its 
territory, and how that quasi-invasion affects conflict classification.  In 2016 
Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC holds the position that 
the general rule of conflict classification applies, consent is a critical and 
dispositive principle, and that international humanitarian law (IHL) is 
independent of the legality of the use of force and jus ad bellum.1  The panel 
discussed the implications of giving consent such a weighted position in the 
determination of conflict classification. 
Determining whether a conflict is an IAC or a NIAC matters, for 
example, when attempting to prosecute people for war crimes and when 
determining what aid to give combatants and non-combatants while the 
conflict is ongoing.2  Different rules apply depending on the classification.  If 
a conflict is classified as an IAC, it will be governed by the first through 
fourth Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 1.  If a conflict is 
classified as a NIAC, it will be governed by Common Article 3, and 
Additional Protocol 2. 
In modern conflicts, it is increasingly common for a State to occupy 
another State’s territory and carry out military operations in that State.  These 
operations are often directed at non-State armed groups who are in a pre-
existing NIAC with the territorial State.  The most common modern example 
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of this phenomena is ISIS in Syria.3  During the discussion, the relevance of 
consent was highlighted with regards to this type of operation.  The 2016 
Commentaries suggest that the presence or absence of consent is essential for 
delineating the applicable legal framework between the territorial State and 
the intervening State.  One panelist noted that should the second State’s 
intervention be carried out without the consent of the territorial State, it 
would amount to an IAC between the intervening State and the territorial 
State.  This is the case even if the intervening State’s conduct is not directed 
at the territorial State’s government or infrastructure. 
One of the panelists, a specialist on the subject of classification, agrees 
with the ICRC that the general rule applies in conflict classification.  The use 
of force triggers an IAC, to which the law of armed conflict applies.  In 
discussing classification, the goal of these laws should be remembered, 
which is to protect civilians and armed forces from harm and to punish 
unruly forces who may not otherwise be penalized.  While most panelists 
agreed that consent should be considered in determining the status of the 
relationship between the intervening State and the territorial State, many felt 
it should not be the sole consideration.  Even if affirmative consent of the 
territorial State is dispositive of the lack of an international armed conflict 
between the two groups, lack of consent should not similarly be treated as 
dispositive.  Sovereignty, similarly, is incorrectly objected to as a reason why 
an IAC is triggered when an armed conflict violates a State’s sphere of 
sovereignty; the panelist felt that the invocation of a State’s sphere of 
sovereignty is a correct consideration if we want to understand what it means 
when two States are in conflict, because a State is its sovereignty. 
One panelist stressed the importance of fact-specific conflict 
classification.  They insisted that state practice is missing in the ICRC 
proposal for conflict classification.  Though it is unclear how we should 
marry the concepts, if you are an outside state, consent matters, as there are 
sovereignty issues at stake that are highlighted in the 2016 Commentary.  To 
determine if an international armed conflict exists between a territorial State 
and an intervening State, one could look at whom the intervening State is 
exercising force against.  If the intervening State is using force against the 
government or the government infrastructure, an international armed conflict 
then exists between those two States.  As another alternative to considering 
consent alone, one could consider the intent of the intervening state.  
However, this comes with the additional difficulty of determining intent.  
Moreover, such an inquiry conflicts with the text and intention of the 2016 
Commentary. 
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There are a number of practical concerns pointed out by panelists that 
serve as reasons for diminishing the current role of consent in the 2016 
Commentary.  The current language creates an odd result in which an IAC is 
immediately created between an intervening State and a territorial State even 
if the only actual conflict is occurring between the intervening state and a 
non-state actor operating in the territory.4  In such a case there would be an 
IAC between the territorial State and the intervening state, but, until the 
requisite level of intensity is met between the intervening state and the non-
state actor, no recognized conflict would exist between them.  This creates 
serious gaps in protection. 
On the other hand, if consent is not given a controlling role, another 
serious gap would be created.  For example, if a territorial State does not or 
cannot immediately respond to a use of force on its territory, during the 
intervening period between the initial use of force and the point at which it 
responds, there is not an IAC.  Politics can, also, be a complicating factor in 
determining consent.  A state can have legitimate reasons for stating one 
thing publicly, and agreeing to another behind closed doors. 
One panelist suggested that too much time was spent on debating the 
classification of conflict.  LOAC should not be concerned with the lawfulness 
of the conflict, but rather focused on the victims of the conflict.  Also, there are 
other legal frameworks to look to such as domestic State law, human rights 
law, and those may actually provide more protections than IHL.  
One panelist was concerned that consent has different meanings.  For 
example, how do you gain consent to enter territory that is no longer in the 
State’s control?  Where a State has lost territory, you still need to ask their 
consent.  An IAC does not have to mean there is aggression; you often have to 
characterize and classify the situation in different terms.  Relatedly, when there 
is a NIAC, it does not automatically mean there is violation of jus ad bellum.  
Consent should play a role in determining classifying conflict, though 
there was not universal agreement as to how controlling consent should be in 
determining IACs or NIACs.  However, it can be difficult to determine 
whether consent exists.  Further, there may be additional considerations 
relative to the withdrawal or lack of consent as it relates to conflict 
classification.  At least several of the panelists agree that State sovereignty is 
a proper consideration in conflict classification.  Overall, the focus on 
consent is an attempt to provide a clear standard.  The panel agreed that an 
unclear standard can allow groups to take advantage of a situation and put 
civilians at risk. 
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